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DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
‘If a picture paints a
thousand words …’: the
development of human
identification techniques
in forensic anthropology
and their implications
for human rights in the
criminal process
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Abstract Newly developed techniques in forensic anthropology offer great
potential to assist in identifying, and ultimately convicting, perpetrators of
serious sexual assaults, particularly those involving young children. They can
also facilitate the prosecution of those who create and disseminate child
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pornography. They do, however, require that photographs be taken of suspects’
hands, and sometimes their genitals. This article explores the human rights
implications which arise from the intrusive procedures needed to obtain the
photographs necessary for comparative purposes. It assesses police powers; the
rights of suspects to privacy and bodily integrity; the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination; and the right to legal advice, and addresses the
question: what are the permissible limits of intrusive searches?
Keywords Human rights; Forensic anthropology; Intrusive searches; Privacy;
Child sexual assault; Police powers
onsider the following scenarios:
• The police discover photographs on A’s mobile phone which show a
toddler being sexually assaulted. The only part of the perpetrator
which is visible is one of his hands.
• The police discover images on B’s computer which show the rape of a
baby. The only parts of the perpetrator which are visible are his
genitals.
Such crimes are difficult to prosecute; direct testimonial evidence from young
children as to the perpetrators’ identities can be difficult, and in the case of very
young children impossible, to obtain. Digital images of abuse are often uploaded
to websites and shared with others, frequently on a global scale.1 Typically,
perpetrators are members of large, sometimes worldwide, paedophile rings
whose membership status depends upon the digital quality of the images they
can contribute as well as the severity of the abuse.2 It is therefore in the perpetra-
tors’ interests to provide close-up imaging of intimate bodily contact. In the
context of internet child pornography, it is common for a perpetrator’s hand to
be visible and this may reveal distinct anatomical features and markings. Part 1
of this article describes newly developed techniques which have the potential to
compare the hands and/or genitals of a suspect with digital images of a perpe-
trator. The contribution the techniques have already made in specific court cases
is discussed, as is their potential in future cases. It also summarises some of the
legal issues raised by the procedures for gathering evidence to be used in these
techniques. The remaining parts of the article examine these issues in more
depth: Part 2 discusses general police powers of search and examination of
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C
1 In one recent Scottish case, police discovered nearly 125,000 indecent images of children: see HM
Advocate v Rennie and Others, unreported, March 2009, discussed further below.
2 C. Money, ‘Legal Responses to New Challenges in Child Protection’, Conference Paper given at Child
Exploitation: Legal Responses to New Challenges in Child Protection, University of Dundee, 2011. (Paper on
file with authors.)
suspects in non-intrusive cases. Part 3 considers the more intrusive
searches/examinations required by some of the new techniques, and the extent
to which these conflict with the right to bodily integrity/privacy. We continue
our exploration of suspects’ rights by considering the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, the right to legal advice, and the protections
offered by court warrants, in Part 4, and summarise our conclusions in Part 5.
Our central focus is on Scots law: the science was developed by forensic anthro-
pologists working in Scotland, and its use to date has been largely confined to
Scottish criminal cases. Child sexual assault and child pornography are,
however, global problems which raise issues of international application. We
therefore draw comparisons with several other countries within the adversarial
tradition, primarily England, Canada and the United States. The questions raised
in the article are central to the meaning of a ‘fair criminal process’, and as such
are of importance to any legal system seeking to ensure compatibility with
human rights instruments.
1. Anthropological identification in a legal context
(a) The techniques
The use of photography to assist in the identification and prosecution of offenders
is not new; it seems that its potential was recognised as early as the 1840s.3 What is
new, however, is that photographic images or other digital images held on
computers can now be analysed using new anatomical comparison techniques. A
team of anatomists and forensic anthropologists at the Centre for Anatomy and
Human Identification (CAHID) has developed these techniques. Led by Professor
Sue Black, the CAHID team is based at the University of Dundee, Scotland. Aside
from fingerprints, hands display features that have discriminatory capacity; the
pattern of the superficial veins, the pattern of knuckle skin creases and even the
shape of fingernails and cuticles may be distinctive.4 The appearance of a scar on a
digital image of abuse may be matched by the team with a digital image of a scar
on a suspect’s hands, as may burns, freckles, age spots and many other character-
istics.
Extensive research to investigate the robustness of statistical application is
being undertaken. At present, however, when called as expert witnesses for the
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3 C. Norris, M. McCahill and D. Wood, ‘The Growth of CCTV: A Global Perspective on the Interna-
tional Diffusion of Video Surveillance in Publicly Accessible Space’ (2004) 2 Surveillance & Society 110.
4 S. M. Black, ‘Novel Science: Hand Identification as an Emerging Technique’: Paper given at Scottish
Universities Insight Institute programme, Scots Law of Evidence—Fit for Purpose in the Digital and Global
Age? (2011); S. M. Black, X. Mallett, C. Rynn and N. Duffield, ‘Forensic Hand Image Comparison as an
Aid for Paedophile Investigations’ (2009) 184 Police Professional 21.
prosecution, the testimony of the CAHID scientists does not include statistical
data on the likelihood that the suspect’s and perpetrator’s hands are one and the
same, but they can point out the many areas of similarity or difference between
the two. Although the absence of evidence of statistical probability may appear
to limit the inferences which may be drawn, such expert testimony has been
given in a number of cases, and has been held to be both relevant and admis-
sible.5 These comparisons can be powerful statements of evidence especially
when the features examined cross different aetiologies of origin. Their
techniques allow the forensic anthropologists to eliminate a suspect if it can be
demonstrated that his or her hands do not ‘match’ the features identified in the
images of the perpetrator. Where, however, the expert is able to testify to the
many and various similarities, often of different aetiology, between the two
images, a jury may readily conclude that the suspect/accused and the perpe-
trator could be the same individual. Similar techniques are currently being
developed for genital comparisons, which could be beneficial in identifying the
perpetrator in our second scenario.
The CAHID methodologies have been used in several cases within the separate
legal jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. In one English civil case, a family court
hearing in relation to the safety of a child, the hand identification techniques
were able to eliminate conclusively two of three male family members from being
possible perpetrators of a sexual assault on the child within their household. This
allowed the stepfather of the child to be admitted back into the family home. In
the first Scottish criminal case, HM Advocate v Rennie and Others,6 photographs
showing the sexual abuse of a baby, which also captured part of the perpetrator’s
thumb, were compared with photographs taken by the police of the hands of a
suspect, Neil Strachan. He and seven other men were prosecuted for various
offences, including attempted rape, conspiracy to commit sexual assault, and the
making, possessing and distributing of child pornography. Black gave evidence of
12 similarities between Strachan’s right hand and the right hand of the perpe-
trator. She was able to demonstrate that a comparison between the suspect’s own
right and left hands revealed no such points of similarity. In particular, there was
a congenital deformity on a lunule—the pale, half-moon-shaped area at the base of
the nail—of a finger of the perpetrator’s right hand. Comparison with 2,900
images of fingers held on a database at CAHID had failed to find a match, but the
distinctive anomaly was present on the police photograph of Strachan’s thumb,
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5 These cases are described further below.
6 Unreported, March 2009, but see: ‘Thumb clue in paedophile trial’, BBC News, 26 March 2009,
available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/7966614.stm>, accessed 25
January 2013.
allowing Black to testify that there was ‘strong evidence to support the proposi-
tion’ that the images were of the same finger and therefore could be from the
same individual.7 The evidence was held to be relevant and admissible, and it was
for the jury as fact-finder to decide how much weight to attach to it. While that
expert testimony fell short of a positive identification of Strachan as the perpe-
trator, it was a very important contribution to the prosecution case, which
resulted in the conviction of the eight accused.8 Two further Scottish cases have
benefited from these techniques. In HM Advocate v Morrison,9 the accused pled
guilty to the rape of a baby girl, and possession of indecent images of children.
Professor Black was able to provide evidence suggesting that it was possible that
Morrison was the perpetrator of the abuse by comparing images of his hands with
indecent photographs found on his computer. In HM Advocate v Dick,10 Black’s
evidence helped to secure the conviction of the accused for sexual assaults,
including rape, involving female children.
(b) The legal issues
The use of novel scientific techniques to obtain evidence from a suspect’s body
raises a host of legal (and ethical) issues, some empirical, others normative,
relating to the permissible limits of intimate searches.11 Our analysis of the legit-
imacy of these police procedures, set out below, draws first upon the position in
Scots law and the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), followed by comparisons with other common law jurisdictions. We
consider the permissible limits of searches in two contexts: non-intrusive circum-
stances, and intrusive circumstances, and then consider the legal protections
surrounding the latter. The legality of any police or prosecution action, and the
extent to which force can be used to facilitate the gathering of evidence, or require
a suspect to assist in providing evidence, will vary from country to country, as will
the precise nature of the rights afforded to an individual at the various stages in
the investigative process. However, irrespective of distinctions in terminology or
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7 Ibid.
8 Two of the accused were given a sentence of life imprisonment.
9 Unreported, 2012, but see ‘Paedophile David Morrison jailed for raping 14-month-old girl’, BBC
News, 20 January 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-
16654504>, accessed 25 January 2013.
10 Unreported, 2011, but see ‘Paedophile Brian Dick jailed for nine years’, BBC News, 9 December
2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-16111127>, accessed 25
January 2013.
11 Novel or emerging scientific techniques raise issues concerning the reliability of the science itself.
An examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, but there is a vast literature, of
which recent major contributions include: the National Academy of Sciences, Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward (National Academies Press: 2009); Law Commission, Expert
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, Law Com. Report 325, HC 829 (TSO: London,
2011); and Report of the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry (Scottish Government: Edinburgh, 2011).
substance, there are fundamental principles of a ‘fair trial’ based on the rule of
law which are recognised and given effect to by all jurisdictions which are signa-
tories to international human rights treaties.12 The right to bodily integrity, to
privacy, and not to be compelled to self-incriminate are important aspects of this,
but these are not absolute; statutory powers or constitutional constraints often
permit some encroachment upon them. In contrast to this, Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides that no-one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is
absolute and is not capable of encroachment.13 In similar vein, both the Eighth
Amendment to the American Constitution and s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms provide that ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ may not be
inflicted.14
2. General police powers of search and examination
Reflecting on the two scenarios we posed in the introduction, what powers do the
police have to obtain suitable photographs of A’s hands and B’s genitals for
comparison with digital images of a perpetrator? Must A and B first be detained or
arrested before photographs can be taken? Do suspects need to consent to exami-
nations or photographing? As acknowledged above, police powers vary from one
jurisdiction to another, but in the European context there is a growing tendency
to interpret Article 6 of the ECHR such that the entire criminal process must be
fair, not merely the trial itself. Thus, there is increasing scrutiny of pre-trial
procedure, as demonstrated by the decision of the ECtHR in Salduz v Turkey,15 and
the application of that case in the Scottish context in Cadder v HM Advocate.16 The
issues raised in our scenarios are most likely to arise where the police have a
suspect whom they wish to search and examine, in which case their powers will be
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12 These include the European Convention on Human Rights, the US Constitution and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The due process provisions within these instruments are
discussed further below.
13 See Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1 (involving threats of torture) and S. C. Greer, ‘Should Police
Threats to Torture Suspects Always Be Severely Punished? Reflections on the Gäfgen Case’ (2011) 11
Human Rights Law Review 67, and the authorities cited there.
14 See also the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (1984), available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm>, accessed 26 January
2013.
15 (2009) 49 EHRR 19.
16 [2010] UKSC 43. These cases are discussed further below. See also Magee v United Kingdom (2001) 31
EHRR 35 in which the ECtHR stated: ‘Article 6—especially paragraph 3—may be relevant before a
case is sent for trial if and so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an
initial failure to comply with its provisions’ (at para. 41).
dependent upon the legal status of the suspect and, in particular, on whether he
has been detained or arrested. In common with many countries, other than where
prescribed by statute for particular offences,17 the general powers vested in the
Scottish police to search a person without consent are very limited, unless the
latter has first been detained or arrested.
In our first scenario, A may well comply with a police request to hold his hands in
a particular way, such that they resemble the hand shape in the photo-
graph/image of the perpetrator, and for photographs of his hands to be taken in
this pose. Strictly speaking, this procedure is an examination, rather than a
search, but the implications are the same. Recent Scottish cases have held that
unless the individual is a ‘suspect’, the police are not obliged to advise him of any
right to refuse, since ‘it must be perfectly obvious that the answer to [such a]
request may be either yes or no’.18 Even if an individual is in fact suspected of
committing a crime, a ‘search’ needs to be distinguished from a request with
which a person voluntarily complies.19 No adverse inferences can be drawn from
a suspect’s refusal to consent. When the issue of amending the law to allow
adverse inferences to be drawn was raised in 1989 by the Scottish Law
Commission in relation to refusals to provide blood and other intimate samples,
this was rejected by the majority of respondents to the Consultation.20 The
judiciary were notably unequivocal:
We wholly oppose any system whereby if consent were refused any
adverse inference could be drawn from the refusal of consent. This
approach seems to us to be wrong in principle. The reasons which may
cause any individual to refuse consent could be various and in a
criminal case we consider that a conviction should depend on
evidence and not on inference.21
This has implications for our scenarios. Asked whether he can be photographed, a
person may be unsure whether there is any alternative other than to agree.
However, it can be argued that any purported consent is only meaningful if its
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17 See, for example, the wide power of search in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 60,
the Terrorism Act 2000, s. 44 and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s. 23(2). Police powers of search in
England are regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), ss. 1–2.
18 Brown v Glen 1998 JC 4 at 8, per Lord Sutherland, distinguishing McGovern v HM Advocate 1950 JC 33
and overruling Normand v Cox 1997 SCCR 24.
19 Devlin v Normand 1992 SCCR 875. See also Urquhart v Higson 1998 GWD 18-889 (HCJ Appeal).
20 Scottish Law Commission, Evidence: Blood Group Tests, DNA Tests and Related Matters, Scottish Law
Com. Report No. 120 (1989) para. 2.27.
21 Ibid.
implications are explained. Police in England and Wales have very similar powers
to their Scottish counterparts but, notably, the English provisions are more clearly
expressed.22 In England, legislation provides that an individual who is to be
searched must first be given the name of the police constable conducting the
search, the objective of the search, and the grounds for proposing it.23 As with
Scots law, the police would be unable to photograph a suspect without consent,
without first arresting him.
In our two scenarios, the police will most likely detain A and B. Any measure
which deprives an individual of his or her liberty must be compatible with Article
5(1) of the ECHR, in order to protect the individual from ‘arbitrariness’.24 That
Article provides that everyone has ‘the right to liberty and security of person’,25
but included among legitimate encroachments on this is ‘the lawful arrest or
detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an
offence’.26 The ECtHR has defined ‘reasonable suspicion’ for the purposes of Article
5(1)(c): ‘[H]aving “reasonable suspicion” presupposes the existence of facts or infor-
mation which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned must
have committed the offence. What may be regarded as “reasonable” will however
depend upon all the circumstances’.27 The finding of photographs/images on A’s
phone and B’s computer would constitute reasonable grounds to suspect them of
having committed offences relating to child pornography,28 or even of being the
perpetrators of the acts depicted in the images.
In most common law jurisdictions, detainees can be searched by the police, and
reasonable force can be used to effect this.29 Typically, police powers of search
authorise them to recover fingerprints, palm prints, saliva samples, hair samples
(but not pubic hair), fingernail or toenail scrapings; and to swab the suspect in
order to obtain a sample of blood, other body fluid, body tissue or other material.30
The position in the United States is similar; in the case of United States v Robinson31
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22 PACE, s. 54A.
23 PACE, s. 2.
24 Bozano v France (1987) 9 EHRR 297 at para. 54.
25 ECHR, Art. 5(1). All adversarial legal systems have similar provisions.
26 ECHR, Art. 5(1)(c).
27 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 157 at para. 32.
28 Contrary to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, ss. 52 and 52A, as amended.
29 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 14(8).
30 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 18(6), inserted by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act
2003, s. 55.
31 414 US 218 (1973).
the Supreme Court made clear that police have powers to search a suspect, so long
as there was ‘probable cause’ justifying the arrest. In Scots law, there would seem
to be little doubt then that, once detained, A could be asked to consent to the
taking of the necessary photographs. Refusal would be met with the use of
‘reasonable force’32—a term which the legislation does not define, but which may
well mean considerable force, if required. Statutory police powers to search and
obtain samples apply equally to a person who has been arrested and is in police
custody.33 They can be searched and examined, even if the alleged crime is not a
particularly serious one.34 In Adair v McGarry,35 Lord Justice-Clerk Alness acknowl-
edged the competing interests in such cases and provided a succinct summary of
the police powers:
As regards undue invasion of the personal rights of the accused, one
must have a sense of proportion. Certain it is that in practice, and
hitherto unchallenged, a person who is suspected of crime may be
brought—with reasonable violence in the event of his resistance—to
the police station, that he may be paraded for purposes of identifi-
cation, that he may be stripped, and that he may be searched for any
incriminating natural or artificial mark upon his person. That mark
may include a birth mark or a natural deformity, a tattoo mark, or
bloodstains or the like.36
Summarising the above, it is clear that the Scottish police have authority to take
photographs of a suspect’s hands following detention or arrest.
3. Police powers of search and examination in intimate circumstances:
intrusive procedures, bodily integrity, dignity and privacy rights
Our second scenario raises a more difficult issue, namely the photographing of an
intimate part of a suspect’s anatomy. It is not clear that the Scottish legislation
would permit this; the police have authority to take ‘relevant external data’, but to
our knowledge there is no precedent within the Scottish authorities which would
encompass the photographing of genitals as an acceptable procedure given its
clear intrusive nature. On the contrary, the legislation provides a closed list of
permitted activities, and more ‘invasive’ procedures such as the taking of a blood
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32 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 19B, inserted by the Crime and Punishment (Scotland)
Act 1997, s. 48(2).
33 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 18(1).
34 See Gellatly v Heywood 1997 JC 171 in which a person who had been arrested for the relatively minor
crime of breach of the peace was subjected to a strip search.
35 1933 JC 72.
36 Ibid. at 80.
sample or pubic hair require a court warrant.37 It seems to us that courts would be
likely to regard such photographs as akin to an ‘invasive procedure’, making it a
necessity to obtain a warrant to photograph intimate parts of the anatomy in
order to avoid a subsequent challenge to the admissibility of any resulting photo-
graphic evidence. We will consider the warrant procedure, and offer a critique of
it, later in the article, but need first to explore the more complex issues arising in
our second scenario. First, we take the limits of the intrusive search a little further.
In some cases, a perpetrator’s penis in a digital image may be in an erect state. If
there is to be an accurate comparison made between that image and a photograph
of the suspect’s penis, it may be that the latter needs to be in a similarly erect state.
This raises the issue of whether the police should be permitted to stimulate an
erection in a suspect, for example, by the use of pornography or by administering
erectile enhancing drugs such as Viagra. Our second scenario raises acutely the
right to bodily integrity, and to privacy. Ought the law to sanction breaches of
these rights in the public interest in the effective investigation and prosecution of
serious crimes such as child sexual assault?
(a) Intrusive procedures and bodily integrity
Although the Scottish legislation does not define or distinguish between ‘intru-
sive’ and ‘non-intrusive’ examinations or procedures, analogies may be drawn
from the common law approach to ‘invasive’ and ‘non-invasive’ searches. Invasive
searches involve the entering of a suspect’s body. As such, they require a court
warrant and must be carried out by a medical practitioner. The leading case on
how far the courts will permit invasive searches is Hay v HM Advocate 38 A judicial
warrant had been granted to allow dental impressions to be made from a youth
accused of murder where the prosecution had asserted that the peculiarities of the
tooth structure in his mouth were an exact fit of the shape and configuration
marks of a bite on the deceased’s breast, and were capable of identifying the
accused as the perpetrator. On appeal against Hay’s subsequent conviction for
murder, the Lord Justice-General, Lord Clyde, observed that there were two
conflicting considerations:
On the one hand there is the need from the point of view of the public
interest for promptitude and facility in the identification of accused
persons and the discovery on their persons or on their premises of
indicia either of guilt or innocence. On the other hand the liberty of
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38 1968 JC 40.
the subject must be protected against any undue or unnecessary
invasion of it.39
He concluded that the dental examination had been properly authorised, and the
resulting evidence had been competently led at the accused’s trial.40 Although this
case was decided in 1968, well before Convention rights were properly embedded
in domestic law, it remains good law.
Blood samples are technically regarded by the courts as ‘invasive’ involving as they
do a puncturing of a suspect’s skin, but modern practice accepts such invasions as
acceptable, in part because of their capacity to both exonerate as well as implicate;
but also because the medical procedures are refined, conclusive, and less intimate
than the photographs required in our second scenario. Cases such as Adair v
McGarry and Hay v HM Advocate demonstrate that the Scottish courts employ the
rhetoric of safeguarding suspects’ bodily integrity, but in practice often find that
this is outweighed by the public interest in the detection of crime.
(b) Dignity and privacy rights
We must also consider whether the right to dignity and to privacy offers a suspect
an argument against the taking of intimate photographs. As noted previously,
Article 3 of the ECHR provides a right to be free from, inter alia, degrading
treatment and it might be suggested that the taking of photographs of a person’s
genitals without his or her consent is degrading.41 The concept of privacy has
many dimensions. It has been described as a fundamental human right recognised
in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and in many other international and regional treaties. Privacy
underpins human dignity and other key values.42 It has acquired growing signifi-
cance due to technological advances with the power to conduct hidden forms of
surveillance which disrupt bodily integrity by dispensing with the need to obtain
consent in order to obtain personal information. For example, having one’s image
captured on a CCTV camera whilst travelling to work, shopping, or even at work, is
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39 Ibid. at 42.
40 Ibid. at 47.
41 Examples of degrading treatment can be found in the Taguba Report into the mistreatment of
detainees in Abu Ghraib confinement facility in Iraq. Some had been videotaped and
photographed while naked, sometimes having been ‘arranged’ in sexually explicit poses for such
photographs. Discussed in The Road to Abu Ghraib (report by Reed Brody, Special Counsel with
Human Rights Watch, June 2004), available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/
index.htm>, accessed 25 January 2013.
42 D. Banisar and S. Davies, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Practice,
available at <http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html>, accessed 25 January 2013.
now an unavoidable aspect of many people’s lives,43 as is the taking of passenger
X-rays at airports (discussed further below).44
Article 8 provides a right to respect for private life, and any interference with this
right requires to be ‘in accordance with law’. Few Scottish criminal cases have
considered this issue.45 In the English law case of R v Khan46 the House of Lords
rejected an appeal from a convicted drug dealer who had argued that evidence
against him had been obtained by the use of covert surveillance techniques, in
breach of Article 8. Their Lordships held that even if there had been a breach of
privacy, this did not mean that the evidence thereby obtained ought to have been
declared inadmissible at Khan’s trial. However, when the case reached the ECtHR,
it held that the lack of clear legal regulation of the surveillance techniques
employed meant that the breach of privacy had not been ‘in accordance with
law’.47 The court also held that the use of evidence obtained in breach of Article 8
could infringe the right to a fair trial under Article 6, but that the fairness of the
trial would need to be looked at in the round.
Breaches of the right to privacy under Article 8(2) can be justified if ‘necessary in a
democratic society’ for, inter alia, the prevention of crime, or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. The interpretation of this right, in common with so
many other Convention rights, is a balancing exercise involving various factors,
such as the public interest in managing crime and securing justice as well as the
public interest in ensuring individuals’ privacy interests. The parameters of this
balancing exercise are relatively easy to state, but not necessarily so easy to
determine in practice. As well as being ‘necessary’, breaches of Article 8 must also
be ‘proportionate’, and the interpretation of these terms is a matter for judicial
discretion.48 In Friedl v Austria 49 the ECtHR ruled that there was no breach of Article
8 in the police taking and storing photographs of a person who was participating
in a demonstration. This suggests that the taking of someone’s photograph even
without that person’s consent is not an unwarranted breach of privacy where this
is done to aid the investigation of crime.50
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48 A. Brown, Criminal Evidence and Procedure, 3rd edn (Avizandum: Edinburgh, 2010) 49.
49 (1995) 21 EHRR 88.
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(c) International comparisons
The right to privacy and bodily integrity is less developed in Scottish (and indeed
English) law than in other jurisdictions. Both Canada and the United States offer
ample sources of comparison, since privacy rights (and indeed the right not to be
compelled to self-incriminate51) are embedded in their constitutions. Despite
this, the expectation that privacy rights must generally yield to the public
interest in law enforcement reflects decision-making in the Supreme Courts of
both countries. Specific protection is provided in s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms which states: ‘Everyone has the right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure’.52 In R v Golden,53 the Canadian Supreme Court
split 5:4 in determining that a deeply intrusive strip search for drugs concealed
by the appellant was unlawful. The majority stressed that strip searches
‘represent a significant invasion of privacy and are often a humiliating,
degrading and traumatic experience for individuals subject to them’.54 In similar
vein, the Fourth Amendment to the American Constitution provides: ‘The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated’. The Amendment
continues: ‘and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized’. ‘Probable cause’ has been defined by the
Supreme Court to mean that:
… the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.55
American courts have upheld a variety of search procedures once a suspect has
been arrested.56 These are summarised by LaFave to include:
the placing of the arrestee’s hands under an ultraviolet lamp;
examining the arrestee’s arms to determine the age of burn marks;
swabbing the arrestee’s hands with a chemical substance; taking
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53 [2001] 3 SCR 679, 2001 SCC 83.
54 Ibid.
55 Brinegar v United States 338 US 160 at 175–6 (1948). For a history of the warrant in the United States
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1444.
56 See P. R. Shuldiner, ‘Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches’ (1979) 13 J
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scrapings from under the arrestee’s fingernails; taking a small sample
of hair from the arrestee’s head; obtaining a urine sample from the
arrestee; giving the arrestee a breathalyzer examination; swabbing
the arrestee’s penis; taking dental impressions from the arrestee; or
taking pubic hair combings from him.57
The reference to the swabbing of an arrested person’s penis in the above quotation
illustrates that the police in the United States already have the power to undertake
more invasive procedures than their Scottish counterparts. Indeed, the leading
case of Schmerber v California58 in 1966 established the principle that invasive proce-
dures were not per se a contravention of the Fourth Amendment—it depended on
the facts and the reasonableness of the proposed procedure weighed against the
interests of the state. In United States v Crowder59 in 1976, the defendant in a prose-
cution for robbery and murder had a bullet lodged in his wrist. The police and
prosecution believed that he had either been shot, or had shot himself, during the
commission of these offences, and that examination of the bullet in the defen-
dant’s forearm would confirm that he and the victim had been in a struggle
during which the latter had been fatally shot. The Federal District Court
authorised the surgical removal of the bullet, granting a warrant at a contested
hearing where the defendant was represented. The procedure for removing the
bullet was subsequently described as a simple operation with local anaesthetic:
‘The surgery … consisted of an incision one-quarter inch deep and one inch deep in
fat immediately under the skin. Crowder lost less than five cubic centimetres of
blood during the ten minute operation’.60 Having been convicted, Crowder argued
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the bullet
evidence had been unlawfully obtained. The appeal was at first granted, but the
court then agreed to withdraw that opinion and have it reconsidered by an en banc
hearing. The full bench of nine judges affirmed the conviction by a slender
majority of five to four.61
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The reasoning of the majority in the Court of Appeals has been described by one
commentator as ‘irresistible’,62 but criticised by another as focused on procedure
at the expense of the substantive issues raised by the Fourth Amendment.63 This is
a familiar criticism, echoed in other US judgments which have voiced concerns
that surgery is an invasion of the body on an altogether different scale from that
performed in a simple needle puncture to draw blood or the forced adminis-
tration of an emetic.64 Thus, a decade later, in the case of Winston v Lee,65 the US
Supreme Court refused to authorise surgery to remove a bullet wedged in the
chest of a suspected armed robber. In contrast to Crowder, in Winston the bullet was
lodged under the suspect’s collar bone and only reachable by surgery requiring a
general anaesthetic. The court found the surgical procedure unreasonable in the
latter case:
The operation sought will intrude substantially on [Lee’s] protected
interests. The medical risks of the operation, although apparently not
extremely severe, are a subject of considerable dispute; the very
uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’
In addition, the intrusion on [his] privacy interests entailed by the
operation can only be characterized as severe.66
Alan Hyde has been scathing of the American courts’ failure to develop clear
principles concerning the parameters of invasions of the body.67 He criticises the
jurisprudence on this issue for its ‘complete nonanalysis’, ‘failure to offer any
explanation of the basis of distinguishing cases’, and use of language which he
describes as ‘a comical parody of a legal standard’.68 He concludes that the expla-
nation for the judicial reluctance to set norms in this area is self-interest—‘to
preserve maximum possible freedom of action for this and future courts
addressing the constitutionality of intrusive bodily searches’.69 Hyde claims the
absence of clear principles increasingly allows the factual context to dominate
interpretations of vague concepts such as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘the interests of the
state’. These are strong words but are borne out by empirical research which
affirms that decision-making in these fundamentally ‘grey’ areas is both individu-
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 141
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
62 C. A. Iannaccone, ‘Criminal Procedure—Search and Seizure—Bodily Intrusions—Substantive
Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Rights’ (1975–76) 50 Tulane Law Review 411 at 412.
63 Barron, above n. 61.
64 Rochin v California 342 US 165 (1952).
65 470 US 573 (1985).
66 Doubtless, a separate consideration supporting the court’s decision was that there was sufficient
other evidence without the bullet to convict (ibid. at 767).
67 A. Hyde, Bodies of Law (Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ, 1997).
68 Ibid. at 177.
69 Ibid.
alistic and subjective.70 While there is nothing unusual in depicting judicial
discretion as individual, its characterisation as subjective is a more worrying
criticism. The, admittedly few, reported Scottish cases which have considered
similar issues reflect a similar reluctance to establish boundaries and clear
criteria.
(d) Conclusions
We would propose that the public interest in the investigation, detection, prose-
cution and prevention of serious cases of sexual assault or child pornography
outweigh a suspect’s rights to privacy when it comes to having his or her hands or
other intimate parts of his or her anatomy, including genitals, photographed.
Beyond photographs or other equivalent still images, we would argue that legis-
lation would be required to permit deeper incursions of bodily privacy. For
example, applying our proposition in the second scenario, any procedures aimed
at erectile stimulation would require specific judicial oversight through a court
warrant. Such warrants, together with the well-established safeguards offered by
the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to legal advice prior to police
interview, and destruction of evidence post acquittal71 are capable of providing
sufficient protection to suspects in instances of intimate searches, though that is
not to say they could not be challenged. To test our proposition we need to explore
the rigour of the current legal protections.
4. Legal protections: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
legal advice and court warrants
As already discussed at various earlier stages in this article, the privilege against
self-incrimination, the suspect’s access to legal advice prior to interrogation, and
the court warrant all have a role to play in protecting the suspect. Do these rights
offer sufficient protection? Assuming more stringent considerations apply in the
taking of more intimate/intrusive photographs, such as requiring the police to
obtain a warrant, are there any limits to the type of photographs in respect of
which the police can seek authority?
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(a) Self-incrimination
The right to a fair trial recognised by Article 6 of the ECHR has been interpreted as
implying a right or privilege not to be compelled to incriminate oneself.72 This has
also been recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 14, and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. There
is a vast literature on the topic, especially in the common law world, as these
rights are central to adversarial criminal proceedings.73 The presumption of
innocence, the right to silence and the right not to be compelled to self-incrim-
inate all emerge from the same conceptual base, namely a right (whether
procedural, in Scotland and England, or constitutional, in the United States and
Canada) not to have to bear witness against oneself when accused of committing a
crime and facing prosecution.74 The privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation has been described as ‘a principled constraint on the ability of the State to
gather and use evidence against suspects’.75
The ECtHR has, however, tended to distinguish between the ‘right to silence’ and
other forms of self-incrimination. In Saunders v United Kingdom,76 although the
court referred to both the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself
as ‘generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the
notion of a fair procedure under Article 6’,77 it nevertheless described the latter
right as being ‘primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person
to remain silent’.78 Where evidence is obtained from a suspect which has ‘an
existence independent of the will of the suspect such as … documents acquired
pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily tissue for the
purpose of DNA testing’,79 cases such as Saunders illustrate that the Strasbourg
court has been less willing to find that there has been a breach of the privilege
against self-incrimination or the right to a fair trial. This echoes a distinction
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76 (1997) 23 EHRR 313.
77 Ibid. at para. 68.
78 Ibid.
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which was made by the Scottish courts some years before Saunders. In Lees v
Weston80 Lord Justice-Clerk Ross noted:
… a person whose fingerprints are forcibly taken is entirely passive,
and he is not compelled to do anything requiring any exercise of his
own will or control of his body. Accordingly, in my opinion, to require
an accused person to provide fingerprint impressions is materially
different from interrogating an accused person and requiring him to
answer questions. No positive action is required of a person whose
fingerprints are being taken.81
It may, however, be the case that a distinction could be made between the taking
of fingerprints, and photographing a suspect’s hands while he is in a particular
pose or engineering an erect penis—neither of the latter situations can readily be
achieved without a degree of cooperation on the part of the suspect. As stated
previously, a court has power to grant a warrant authorising such photographs.
The legal position may be clear, but the normative question remains: should a
suspect be required to cooperate in a procedure which may well incriminate him?
It was suggested in Saunders that one purpose of the right to silence is to minimise
miscarriages of justice due to unreliable confessions being made as a result of
coercion or oppression.82 It may be argued that physical evidence obtained from
DNA analysis or hand comparisons is far less likely to lead to erroneous convic-
tions, since the reliability of such evidence is rarely in doubt.
The ECtHR has not always limited the right not to self-incriminate to cases
involving compelled speech. In O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom83 the court
stressed that the nature and degree of the compulsion used to obtain the evidence
were important considerations, as were the existence of any safeguards and the
use to which the evidence was likely to be put. In Jalloh v Germany84 a suspected
drug trafficker was forced to undergo an emetic to obtain evidence of the drugs he
had swallowed. The ECtHR acknowledged that although the Convention did not
prohibit recourse to a forcible medical intervention that would assist the investi-
gation of an offence, ‘any interference with a person’s physical integrity carried
out with the aim of obtaining evidence had to be the subject of rigorous
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scrutiny’.85 The court held Jalloh’s experience to be both inhuman and degrading
treatment (contrary to Article 3), and also contrary to Article 6 on the basis that
the procedure breached his right not to be forced to self-incriminate.86
Photographing a person’s genitals is arguably less of an interference with physical
integrity than the forcible administration of medication to induce vomiting. As
the court in Jalloh put it:
… the degree of force used in the present case differs significantly
from the degree of compulsion normally required to obtain the types
of material referred to in the Saunders case. To obtain such material, a
defendant is requested to endure passively a minor interference with
his physical integrity (for example when blood or hair samples or
bodily tissue are taken). Even if the defendant’s active participation is
required, it can be seen from Saunders that this concerns material
produced by the normal functioning of the body (such as, for
example, breath, urine or voice samples). In contrast, compelling the
applicant in the instant case to regurgitate the evidence sought
required the forcible introduction of a tube through his nose and the
administration of a substance so as to provoke a pathological reaction
in his body. … this procedure was not without risk to the applicant’s
health.87
The American courts had a similar case more than 50 years before Jalloh: the case of
Rochin v California88 ruled that a forced emetic procedure violated the due process
clause in the US Constitution.89 Having one’s private parts photographed, or even
the facilitation of an erection, are intrusive procedures; however, they do involve
the ‘normal functioning of the body’ (albeit in the alien environment of a police
station), and do not endanger a suspect’s physical health. The administration of
pharmaceutical drugs, such as Viagra, may be a different matter. No doctor would
administer a pharmaceutical drug for non-therapeutic purposes to an individual
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who did not consent to this. Jalloh is a salutary reminder that there is a limit to
what the state can do in its acquisition of physical evidence.
The Scottish courts have wrestled with the issue of self-incrimination and physical
evidence obtained from the body of a suspect, albeit in cases involving less
intrusive procedures. In relation to medical examinations, in Forrester v HM
Advocate,90 a police surgeon had examined a suspect’s hand in order to compare a
wound on one of his fingers with a damaged glove which had been found near the
crime scene. The leading of this evidence was objected to at trial on the basis that
the hand examination was carried out without the accused’s consent and without
him being informed that any results might be used in evidence. It was also argued
that the suspect ought to have been advised that he was not compelled to submit
to the examination, that he was entitled to be examined by a doctor of his own
choosing, and that he should have been afforded facilities for summoning his own
doctor.91 Lord Justice-General Cooper rejected these arguments, holding that ‘it
would be an unjustifiable interference with the detection and investigation of
crime if we were to lend any support to any of the suggestions which underlie it’.92
In Wilson v Milne93 the court stated that ‘it is obviously in the interest of justice and
of the accused himself that the blood found on the accused’s boots and the blood
found on the clothing of the victim, should either be reconciled or distinguished’.
While it may be in the accused’s interests if the two are distinguished, if it is
indeed the victim’s blood on the accused’s boots this is unlikely to benefit the
accused.
In HM Advocate v Milford94 the prosecution sought a warrant to obtain a blood
sample from a person suspected of rape. In rejecting the defence argument that
the accused should not be expected to self-incriminate, Sheriff Macphail said:
The taking of a blood sample … seems to me, in the exceptionally
grave circumstances of this case, to be a reasonable and necessary step
in the interests of justice, and I am inclined to the view that the
arguments that an invasion of bodily integrity is involved and that the
accused is being obliged to supply evidence against himself are not
strong enough to succeed in this case, having regard to the gravity of
the crime under investigation and the necessity for the ascertainment
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of the truth. I am satisfied that the circumstances justify me in
granting the warrant, which I consider neither too wide nor too
oppressive. I shall accordingly grant the warrant.95
Most people would have no difficulty in accepting the court’s reasoning in Milford.
This characterisation of the taking of blood as a ‘comparatively innocuous
process’96 would also claim wide public support. However, Sheriff Macphail also
observed that it was unrealistic to suppose that further successful applications for
invasions of personal liberty were likely to follow were the warrant to be granted
in that case.97 This precisely (if unwittingly) anticipated the issues that need to be
addressed in the digital age. As argued above, there are now much more sophisti-
cated methods of infringing bodily integrity without resort to physical invasion.
Advances in technology permit us to extract stem cells and DNA, conduct scans
and MRIs of the whole body, and gather significant information from brain
imagery, let alone use forensic anthropological and anatomical techniques to
include or exclude perpetrators by photographing their intimate anatomy.98
(b) Access to legal advice
The extent to which a suspect has access to legal advice may impact upon their
right not to be compelled to self-incriminate. For example, in Canada, the Charter
provides that ‘everyone has the right on arrest or detention to retain and instruct
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right’.99 In England, a person
who has been arrested and is being held in custody has a right ‘to consult a
solicitor privately at any time’.100 In Scotland, post Cadder v HM Advocate,101 a suspect
has a right to a private consultation with a solicitor ‘before any questioning of the
suspect by a constable begins’, and ‘at any other time during such questioning’.102
Thus, it is the decision to interview the suspect which triggers the right to legal
assistance.
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If Scottish police ask only one question (‘can we photograph your hands?’), does
this amount to ‘questioning’, triggering the requirement to advise the suspect of
his right to legal advice? The legislation introduced post-Cadder specifies that the
right to legal advice does not apply to the questioning of a suspect to obtain
information which suspects are legally required to provide, namely their name,
address, date and place of birth, and nationality.103 It might be thought that the
explicit exemption from the right to legal assistance prior to answering
questions designed to obtain these details means that any other type of
questioning will trigger the right to legal advice. English law has some authority
on this issue. In the case of Absalom ‘questioning’ was defined as ‘a series of
questions directed by the police to a suspect with a view to obtaining admissions
on which proceedings can be founded’.104 If Scots law were to take an approach
similar to Absalom, it might seem that asking one question concerning cooper-
ation would not amount to ‘questioning’, and the right to legal assistance may
not then be applicable. However, Addison has queried the approach taken in that
case, arguing that ‘one damning reply to a seemingly innocuous question’ ought
to be enough to trigger protections for suspects, such as legal assistance.105 This
is an important issue for our second scenario. The issue could arise if a suspect
consents to photography, but argues at his trial that the evidence from the
photographs ought to be treated as inadmissible, since he was denied his right to
legal assistance prior to having to decide whether or not to consent. The
approach a court takes to this may depend on how it views the right to legal assis-
tance. If it is considered to be a safeguard designed to prevent miscarriages of
justice based on false confessions, police coercion or even brutality leading to
confessions (truthful or otherwise), then there may be no right to legal advice
where the police ask but one question in order to determine whether the suspect
is willing to cooperate. However, given that the whole purpose of seeking
consent is to secure the informed permission of a suspect, without resort to
tricks, deception or misunderstanding, it is submitted that even a single
question which is designed to elicit agreement to examination or search
procedures should qualify as a ‘trigger’ and entitle the suspect to legal advice.
Furthermore, unless the request for photography made reference to its context,
i.e. its potential as incriminating identification evidence, it could be argued
that this constitutes ‘trickery’ and is therefore inimical to a fair criminal
process. After all, a request to photograph hands is clearly purposeful and a
preliminary to a process whereby forensic hand recognition techniques could
be deployed to establish identification of the suspect as a possible perpetrator
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or, equally, evidence that might eliminate the suspect from police inquiries. It
is disingenuous to treat such a request as a procedural formality when it
carries such substantial implications for the suspect. On the basis that
‘every picture tells a story’, a single photograph may implicate to the same
extent as a series of questions. If advances in technology facilitate the
circumvention of the traditional rights available to suspects, such as against
compelled self-incrimination, it behoves us to assess the wider impact of these
new technologies on the protections for suspects and their right to a fair trial. It
may well be that ultimately society would be satisfied with the current
allocation of rights and protections but we must at least address these as legit-
imate concerns, with all the ‘slippery slope’ arguments that naturally attach to
such developments.
In Cadder, the Supreme Court applied the case of Salduz v Turkey106 in which the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR emphasised the importance of protecting the
accused ‘against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities’.107 However, Lord
Hope in Cadder took a broader approach; having cited the dictum in Salduz on the
need to prevent abusive coercion, he added:
There is perhaps an indication here that the primary concern of the
Grand Chamber was to eliminate the risk of ill-treatment or other
forms of physical or psychological pressure as a means of coercing the
detainee to incriminate himself. If that was the aim, it might have
been thought that the use of techniques such as tape-recording [of
police interviews] would meet the need to monitor the need for
fairness and that, as cases where there are real grounds for suspecting
that abusive methods were used can be dealt with appropriately by
the trial judge under Scots procedure, there would be no reason to
doubt the essential fairness of the Scottish system. But the way the
Grand Chamber then went on to express itself removes the possibility
of resorting to such an analysis.108
He then quoted from elsewhere in the Salduz ruling, to the effect that when
incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to legal
advice are then used to obtain a conviction, the ‘rights of the defence will in
principle be irretrievably prejudiced’.109 Lord Hope concluded that the ECtHR had
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treated the presence of a lawyer during police questioning as being ‘necessary to
ensure respect for the right of the detainee not to incriminate himself’.110 If the right
to legal assistance during police questioning is indeed based on a desire to ensure
that suspects do not unwittingly self-incriminate, it follows that it would be
appropriate for that right to extend to consulting a lawyer as to the wisdom (or
otherwise) of consenting to the photographing of their hands. It could be argued
that being asked to consent to a procedure without the implications of that
procedure being properly explained to a suspect is a form of unfairness which
ought not to be condoned by the courts. In the Canadian case of R v Ross,111 the
court stressed:
The right to counsel … means that, once an accused or detained
person has asserted that right, the police cannot, in any way, compel a
detainee or accused person to make a decision or participate in a
process which could ultimately have an adverse effect in the conduct
of an eventual trial until that person has had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to exercise that right.112
The above analysis suggests that provided consent has been obtained transpar-
ently or ‘cooperation’ has been gained with the aid of a court warrant, it seems
unlikely that the privilege against self-incrimination could be interpreted as a bar
to the taking of photographs, even photographs of an intimate nature. However,
to ensure that the implications of consent were fully understood, we submit that
suspects should have a right to legal advice before being asked to consent to
photography. The forced administration of pharmaceutical drugs such as Viagra is
a different matter. In addition to an Article 8 infringement, Article 3, the right
to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, imposes important
limitations on the collection of evidence from the body of a suspect. The need for
the police to first obtain a court warrant to administer drugs, especially in a
non-therapeutic context, would in our view be essential in Scotland and most
common law jurisdictions would very likely take a similar approach. But how
effective are warrants in safeguarding human rights?
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(c) Court warrants
There is no doubt that, across the common law world, warrants which are appro-
priately obtained and implemented give procedural legitimacy to the actions of
the police authorities. In general terms, they often function as a judicial ‘permit’
for the use of reasonable force and for actions that would otherwise be unlawful.
There is an extensive literature on aspects of warrants that are frequently
contested, such as the reasonableness of force or, where action without a warrant
is taken, the urgency of the situation as a justification for proceeding without a
warrant, where one would normally be required.113 For present purposes, the
warrant is of interest in regard to its role in constraining the actions of the police
in the steps they can take to recover admissible evidence through intrusive or
invasive procedures. What are the limits of such procedures if a warrant is to
comply with the ECHR provisions on privacy or the equivalent constitutional
rights pertaining in North America? Analogies with the United States and Canada
give us a rich seam of case law. In both these jurisdictions, the police can search a
person as part of the arrest process—this is to safeguard the officers’ safety and to
prevent the destruction of evidence—but other searches generally require a
warrant.114 In both countries, searches conducted without a warrant are regarded
as ipso facto unreasonable and in breach of the Fourth Amendment/s. 8 of the
Canadian Charter, respectively.115 In the United States the requirement for a
warrant has been described as serving a ‘high function’:
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has inter-
posed a magistrate between the citizen and the police…. The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.116
The Scottish case of Cameron v Cottam117 provides a recent illustration of the impor-
tance the courts place on the need for judicial supervision of police powers to
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gather evidence. This concerned an amendment made to the legislation governing
the granting of pre-trial bail.118 Bail is generally granted in Scotland subject to a
list of ‘standard conditions’ which include requirements that the accused appears
at trial and pre-trial court hearings, and that he does not commit an offence while
on bail or interfere with witnesses.119 Prior to the amendment, the court hearing
the bail application had discretion to add further conditions to ensure that the
standard conditions were observed. It also had discretion over whether to make it
an additional condition that the accused make himself available to participate in
an identification parade or other procedure ‘enabling any print, impression or
sample to be taken from him’.120 The amended legislation made this part of
the standard conditions, such that the accused’s participation became required
whenever he was ‘reasonably instructed by a constable to do so’.121 The appellant
argued that in making this an obligatory part of every bail order, the legislation
was incompatible with the right to liberty and security of the person, safeguarded
by the ECHR. The Appeal Court noted that under the previous law, the taking of
prints, impressions or samples from an accused person following arrest had
required the police to first obtain a warrant from the courts. Lord Eassie criticised
the legislation for having removed ‘all elements of judicial discretion and super-
vision of the question whether the particular accused may be required to submit
to evidence gathering or other investigatory procedures as a counterpart for his
obtaining pre-trial liberty’, and concluded that this was ‘incompatible with the
rights secured to the citizen by Article 5 ECHR’.122
What if a warrant is obtained, authorising the taking of photographs, and possibly
also the administration of stimulant drugs, but the suspect refuses to comply with
its requirements? As previously noted, reasonable force can be used against the
suspect, but in a case such as our second scenario, it is difficult to see how any
useful photographs could realistically be obtained without the suspect’s cooper-
ation. In the Scottish case of Vaughan v Griffiths123 the appellant was charged that
he had refused:
… to submit to an internal search in terms of a lawful search warrant
… to allow him to be conveyed to [a specified hospital] and there to be
examined for the presence of drugs controlled by the Misuse of Drugs
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Act 1971, by an authorised medical practitioner and this he did with
intent to defeat the ends of justice and did attempt to defeat the ends
of justice.
There was evidence from the police that no doctor would be prepared to examine
someone who had been forced to submit to the examination. This is correct:
guidance from the British Medical Association advises doctors that, even if a
warrant authorises a search or examination, they should not proceed with this if
the suspect does not consent.124 In the Vaughan case, faced with his refusal, the
police did not attempt to force the suspect to go to the hospital specified in the
warrant. Quashing the conviction, the Appeal Court held that the appellant
should have been taken to the hospital so that his determination not to cooperate
‘could be put to the test’. The court was of the view that the doctors may have been
able to determine whether he had indeed swallowed drugs by means of an X-ray,
which ‘might not have been objectionable to the appellant since its order of
invasion of the body was so much less than the other suggested means of examina-
tion’.125 It was fatal to the conviction that his refusal of cooperation was not tested.
The requirement in many jurisdictions that intrusive examinations and searches
need to be authorised by a warrant, issued by a court, provides an important
safeguard for suspects. However, the ex parte nature of the warrant procedure in
Scotland can be criticised particularly in light of developments in the interpre-
tation of the ECHR which emphasise the fairness of the criminal process as a
whole, rather than merely the trial itself. The Vaughan case is noteworthy for the
fact that there was no suggestion from the court that refusal to comply with a
warrant was not a competent basis for a charge of attempting to defeat the ends of
justice. The potentially serious consequences for a suspect of such a refusal lends
further weight to the argument that suspects ought generally to be afforded an
opportunity to contest the granting of the warrant.
5. Conclusions
Modern technology shifts the debate on the boundaries of bodily invasion and its
privacy implications beyond traditional forms such as surgery and emetics. While
these new technologies do not involve physical penetration of the body, they
nonetheless impact on bodily integrity and privacy rights. Arguably the impact
is even greater because the person ‘invaded’ may have no awareness of the
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invasion; an analogy can be made with the use of remote thermal imaging to
gather intelligence.126 The use of ‘backscatter’ X-rays at airports has been
mentioned above. These images reveal not only weapons, explosives and
concealed drugs, but also ‘rolls of fat, the size of breasts and genitals, and catheter
tubes’.127 They have been described as providing images ‘of near-pornographic
quality’ tantamount to ‘a black and white strip search’.128 One author who has
explored whether the use of such X-ray devices in the United States breaches the
Fourth Amendment has concluded that much will depend on whether the making
of the images is judged to be ‘unreasonable’. Given the perceived dangers from
terrorism in air travel, their use may well be held to be reasonable. In Schmerber v
California,129 referred to previously, the Supreme Court ruled that the proper
function of the Fourth Amendment was as a constraint ‘not against all intrusions
as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or
which are made in an improper manner’.130 If making such images is indeed an
acceptable part of airline security, then it could be argued that the taking of a
photograph of a suspect—even of an intimate part of that suspect—will be far
easier to justify. After all, the great majority of those who are routinely scanned at
airports will not have been suspected of committing any crime, unlike A and B in
our scenarios. However, airport passengers can avoid the whole-body imaging
process by choosing not to fly. The options of a person who has been detained by
the police are far more limited.
Although privacy is an undeveloped concept in Scots law, if the issue were to come
before the Scottish courts, it can be anticipated that a warrant would be needed
before the police could take intimate photographs of a suspect. It seems likely that
such a warrant would be granted as reasonable and proportionate, given the
public interest in securing evidence of serious criminal offences. Photographs of
genitalia certainly cross boundaries of personal privacy, but they are not intrusive
in the way that courts have tended to interpret the concept. They need not involve
physical contact (unless some positioning is required to create a ‘match’ with
digital images) and they cause no physical pain or suffering. However, without the
consent of the suspect, such procedures, more so any steps taken to stimulate an
erection, for example by the use of pornography or by administering erectile
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enhancing drugs, must, we submit, cross the threshold of constituting degrading
and inhuman treatment in terms of Article 3. Even if legislation was enacted to
permit state-sanctioned bodily interference in this way, it would be bound to be
challenged as an infringement of human rights.
The new identification techniques which we have described are immensely
valuable; they have enormous potential to bring the perpetrators of serious sexual
offences to justice. This must not be lost sight of in discussing the possible human
rights dimensions of acquiring the photographs necessitated by these techniques.
The issues discussed in this article have outlined some of the human rights issues
associated with forensic anatomical identification techniques. Debates elsewhere
in the common law world suggest we are only scratching the surface of the scale of
the implications for society of emerging technologies. For example, Donohue
argues that current mainstream biometric technologies with implications for
individual liberty and privacy rights include facial recognition, iris scanning,
fingerprinting, and audio signatures.131 She also cautions that this is the tip of the
iceberg, and she asks: ‘What happens when we move into future modalities, such
as gait technologies, hormone sniffing, and other signature detection technol-
ogies?’132
The opinion we expressed in respect of the potential impact of the right to legal
advice is a reasoned argument as to what the limits of encroachment on bodily
integrity parameters currently are, and what they ought to be. It is arguable that
the right to a fair trial, and in particular the right to legal advice—newly recog-
nised in Scotland—could be interpreted as encompassing the right to such advice
prior to a suspect deciding whether or not to cooperate in the taking of potentially
incriminating photographs. We also suggest that the procedure for the granting
of warrants in situations lacking in urgency requires to be reconsidered; in our
view, the intrusive nature of the photographs in our second scenario mandates the
right of suspects, and their legal advisers, to be heard in any decision over the
granting of such a warrant.
Our conclusions are that if jurisdictions wish to be confident that they have robust
procedures for conducting intimate searches and examinations and obtaining
photographs of intimate parts of the anatomy, they will need to ensure that their
warrant processes are ECHR-compliant or otherwise constitutionally sound, and
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that access to legal advice is available prior to a suspect consenting to any intimate
photographs. In the event of a suspect failing to cooperate thereafter, a prose-
cution for attempting to defeat the ends of justice might be feasible, but would be
jeopardised if informed consent had not been sought. While it is unlikely that the
taking of intimate photographs would amount to a breach of the right to privacy,
guaranteed by Article 8, forcing a suspect to submit to methods of erectile stimu-
lation appears to us to represent a degree of compulsion that is incompatible with
Article 3.
Given the international reputation of the CAHID team, and of Professor Black
in particular, it is only a matter of time before their expertise is called upon in
jurisdictions beyond those of the United Kingdom.133 Their identification methods
may well be replicated by forensic anthropologists in other countries, whose
prosecutors and defence counsel will then have to grapple with some of the
issues explored in this article. We have analysed some implications of the
evidence-gathering processes from the perspective of Scottish law, but other juris-
dictions are urged to do likewise, both to ensure that suspects’ human rights are
upheld where applicable, and that failure to attend to these rights does not
jeopardise the successful prosecution of future cases.
156 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES: HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
133 CAHID already collaborates with INTERPOL and several European partners: see
<http://www.lifesci.dundee.ac.uk/news/2010/07/30/cahid-european-collaboration-develop-global-
disaster-victim-identification-database>, accessed 26 January 2013.
